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Summary 
It has been estimated that African countries need economic growth of around 7 per cent 
per annum in order to halve the number of people living on less than one dollar a day. 
However, as a result of the global economic crisis, Africa’s average growth prognosis 
has been revised downwards from the projected 5 per cent for 2009 to only 1.7 per cent. 
Many countries will, in fact, see growth contracting substantially in 2009. This is the 
direct outcome of falling export demand and tourism receipts, declining commodity 
prices, reductions in the availability of credit and trade finance, and less inflows of 
remittances, private portfolio flows and foreign direct investment. These in 2009 could 
amount to a reduction of US$60 billion in financial inflows to the continent. Countries 
most at risk are those depending on oil exports, experiencing fiscal and current account 
deficits, lacking adequate foreign exchange reserves, suffering from debt overhangs and 
crippled by weak governance.  
Recovery from the crisis would require appropriate and timely short-term measures that 
are consistent with the long-term imperative of strengthening country resilience through 
the diversification of economies, improvement of governance, including the 
environment for doing business, and reform of the global financial and aid architecture. 
Short-term measures should focus on mitigation and coping. Mitigation, largely a task 
for the international community, should include up-to-date monitoring of the impact of 
the crisis, restoring confidence in banks, and expanding trade and trade finance. Coping 
actions, largely the responsibility of individual countries albeit with the assistance of the 
donors, should include expanding domestic demand and absorbing the financial losses 
in countries with the means, targeting vulnerable households, expanding self-
employment, utilizing technical assistance, and enlarging peacekeeping operations, if 
necessary. 
In pursuing these short-term measures, African countries and the international 
community should avoid five pitfalls, which could result in these nations slipping into 
anti-growth ‘policy syndromes’. These are (i) creation of another boom-bust cycle and 
enflaming the historically high volatility of African growth, including inflation,   
(ii) the generation of another debt crisis, (iii) failure to prevent, either through adverse 
redistribution or state failure, households from engaging in adverse coping strategies 
with lasting impacts; (iv) reversal of the gains made in opening up African economies 
and re-introduction of crippling state controls; and (v) entrenching inequities and 
inefficiencies in the global financial and aid architecture. The latter is a particular risk 
inherent in the reaction of the G-20 nations to the crisis, and requires a more inclusive 
response on the level of the UN. 
1 Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa1 is one of the world’s developing regions most at risk from the 
current global economic crisis. In this paper we show why African countries are at risk 
                                                 
1   ‘Africa’ in this paper will imply Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The assessment and arguments we make 
generally also apply to the group of countries described as the ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs), 
given that 33 of the 50 LDCs are in Africa. Karshenas (2009), however, deals in greater depth with the 
impact of the crisis on the LDCs. 2 
and what can be done about it. Based on recent UNU-WIDER work2 we set out a 
framework for considering recovery measures, and argue that these measures should 
comply with the longer-term need to strengthen governance and keep policy 
environment ‘syndrome free’ (SF).  
Before proceeding, let us explain consistent and ‘syndrome free’ (SF) policy 
environment. By consistent, we mean that the affected countries as well as the 
international community should align short-term measures to support recovery in 
Africa. But given that we are facing a global downturn, we also recognize that advanced 
economies need short-term measures to revive their own economies. All three sets of 
short-term measures (by African governments, for African countries by the international 
community, and by advanced economies for their own recovery) ought to be consistent 
with the long-term development needs of Africa. Indeed, in the past, short-term 
expediency in Africa in the face of external shocks has led to the adoption of suboptimal 
long-term policies.  
The long-term development needs of Africa are best attained by keeping policy 
environment ‘syndrome  free’ (Fosu and O’Connell 2006). A policy environment is 
perceived to be ‘SF’ if it is largely free from anti-growth policy ‘syndromes’ 
(combination of various policies with adverse effects), such as state controls, adverse 
redistribution, suboptimal intertemporal allocation, and state breakdown (Fosu 2007). 
State controls involve the control of resource allocation by the state, including direct 
and indirect controls of prices and actual state production and distribution, supplanting 
the role of markets. Under adverse redistribution, government officials redistribute 
resources to their cronies and in favour of their regional constituencies, usually with 
ethnic undertones, in a manner that exacerbates polarization. In the case of suboptimal 
intertemporal allocation, excessive public spending overshoots the inter-temporal 
optimal allocation of resources, so that when a ‘bust’ invariably occurs, incomes will 
fall faster than they should have. The final policy syndrome, state breakdown, would 
constitute a situation involving violent conflict such as a civil war or a coup d’état, 
leading to a breakdown in the rule of law. Fosu (2009c) finds that the absence of such 
policy syndromes could increase annual per capita GDP growth in Africa by nearly 3.0 
percentage points.  
Indeed, much of the historically high growth in Africa in recent years has been 
accompanied by an increase in the prevalence of SF policy environment. Consider, for 
instance, that between 1961 and 1975 Africa experienced an average annual GDP 
growth of 4.5 per cent. As shown by Fosu (2009c:15), the immediate post-independence 
period of robust growth was characterized by a high prevalence (50 per cent) of SF 
policy environment. Growth declined to 2.1 per cent over the next ten years as SF 
policy environments were gradually eroded. After the cold war, many African 
economies in the mid to late 1990s experienced some progress in consolidating 
economic and political reforms. Average annual GDP growth during 1995-99 rose to 
3.4 per cent and accelerated even further between 2003 and 2006 to an average of 8.1 
per cent—the highest of any region after East Asia and the Pacific. 
Although momentum in the world economy and high commodity prices contributed to 
this improved growth record, better governance that led to SF policy environment and 
                                                 
2   See Fosu (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) and Naudé (2009a, 2009b).  3 
stimulated increases in total factor productivity were also important. As commodity 
prices tumble down and the world economy is likely to recover rather slowly, the need 
in Africa for SF policy environment to allow mitigation, coping and risk reduction is 
greater than ever. 
Moreover, the need is greater still, given the justifiably grave concerns that the current 
global economic downturn will reverse development on the continent that has 
experienced its best post-independence growth. However, the urgency to implement 
short-term measures to address what has been termed a ‘development emergency’ 
(World Bank 2009) should avoid compromising SF policy environment. This could 
result in countries slipping into the anti-growth policy syndromes mentioned above.  
In this paper we point to five pitfalls that should, in particular, be avoided. These 
include the hazards of (i) creating a boom-bust cycle and enflaming the historically high 
volatility of African growth and inflation, (ii) generating another debt crisis, (iii) failing 
to prevent, either through adverse redistribution or state failure, households from 
engaging in adverse coping strategies with lasting impacts; (iv) reversing gains made in 
opening up African economies or re-introducing crippling state controls; and   
(v) entrenching inequities and inefficiencies in the global financial and aid architecture. 
The latter is a particular risk inherent in the reaction to the crisis by the G-20 and 
requires a more inclusive response from the UN (see Naudé 2009b).  
If a set of short-term policies can be crafted that are globally consistent, it would make a 
significant contribution towards eventually reducing the degree to which African 
countries are at risk from future global economic shocks. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, in section 2 we assess the 
vulnerability of African countries to the shocks induced by the global economic crisis. 
In section 3 we examine how resilient African countries are, given that a country’s 
degree of risk to an external shock depends not only on its vulnerability, but also on its 
resilience. We put particular emphasis on governance and SF policy environment as the 
vital ingredients of resilience. Then, in section 4 we discuss policy options to facilitate 
recovery, making a distinction between risk mitigation, risk coping and risk reduction 
measures. In section 5, we identify the risks to development triggered by the crisis and 
responses to it. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Africa’s  vulnerability   
2.1  Brief background 
The financial crisis, erupting in the US financial markets in October 2008,3 and quickly 
spreading to affect financial institutions in Europe, has its roots in a combination of 
factors. These include easy and cheap credit (especially after the dot-com bubble burst 
in 2000), a bubble in house prices, excessive deregulation and inadequate supervision of 
financial institutions, rapid innovation in highly leveraged financial derivative 
instruments that only a few people understood (e.g., CDSs, CDOs, CMOs), expansion 
of sub-prime mortgage lending via predatory lending practices and skewed incentives, 
                                                 
3  A timeline of the financial crisis is provided by Guillén (2009).  4 
among others, that encouraged inappropriate risk-taking by financiers and traders as 
well as inappropriate ratings being awarded to securities. Reviews and analyses of the 
causes of the crisis are contained in Morris (2008), Eichengreen et al. (2009) and Taylor 
(2009). 
In early December 2008, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
confirmed that the US economy was in recession, and a week later estimates were 
released showing that the UK economy was also contracting. Soon it became clear that 
other members of the EU, such as France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden amongst 
others, and other major markets such as Japan and Singapore, were also in recession. 
Initially, because of three factors, many had hoped that the African countries might be 
spared the fallout from the crisis: first, the crisis originated in the financial sector of the 
United States whereas African banks had limited exposure to US-originated securities; 
second, the initial expansionary fiscal and monetary policies implemented by US and 
European governments were sufficient to stimulate their economies to prevent a slump 
in demand and a decline in aid to Africa, and third, given the expansion of trade 
between Africa and Asia in recent years, there might have been some de-coupling of the 
dependency of African growth rates on US and European momentum. 
By the end of the first quarter of 2009, there was a growing awareness that these hopes 
were too optimistic. For one, it started to become obvious that Africa’s financial 
markets would not escape unharmed, and that the effect would be more subtle, and 
perhaps longer in duration. By and large, the continent’s major economies have not had 
serious banking problems, although they are, as indicated by the IMF’s financial stress 
index (IMF 2009b), experiencing stress.  
Second, despite financial sector bailout programmes as well as fiscal and monetary 
stimulus packages being adopted by the US, EU and other countries as early as 
November 2008, it was obvious by the end of the first quarter of 2009 that these 
economies had failed to respond. For instance, between October and December 2008 
approximately US$2 trillion had been allocated towards financial sector bailouts (e.g., 
in the form of bank recapitalizations and guarantees), and approximately US$800 billion 
for fiscal expansion (in the UK, EU and also China and India). Interest rates were cut 
significantly by the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of 
England, and central banks in Canada, China, Denmark, Japan Sweden and South 
Korea—in many instances, to the lowest level in 50 years. In spite of these schemes, 
growth prospects continued to worsen,4 reducing at the same time the demand for 
exports to such an extent that IMF forecasts in April 2009 predicted 11 per cent drop in 
global trade for 2009. This is a significant revision of their October 2008 estimate of a 
2.8 per cent decline. Simultaneously, the worldwide gap in trade finance had increased 
from the initial estimate of US$25 billion in November 2008 to US$100 billion by 
March 2009.  
As bailout and stimulus plans failed to stem the decline in world trade and trade finance, 
there were fears foreign aid (official development assistance, ODA) to African countries 
                                                 
4   According to Taylor (2009),the pumping of liquidity into global markets is based on a misdiagnosis 
and the crisis is one of counterparty risk rather than the shortage of liquidity. As such, he argues, that 
‘government actions and interventions caused, prolonged and worsened the financial crisis’ (ibid.: .  5 
could decline: Ireland, Italy and Latvia have cut their aid budgets.5 Given that aid 
always tends to decline during recessions, it may not be unreasonable to expect further 
declines—even if this goes against the commitments made by the advanced countries at 
the International Conference on Financing for Development in Doha in December 2008. 
Third, the hope that African countries might be able to avoid the worst of the financial 
and economic crisis in the west because of a decoupling of growth rates was also overly 
optimistic. Africa’s growth rates and expected future growth patterns came down with 
an amazing speed after the crisis erupted in September 2008. And the slim hope that 
Africa’s stronger trade and investment ties with China and India may have provided 
some protection was dashed when it became clear that also these economies were 
adversely hit by the crisis. It is thus obvious that African countries cannot escape the 
global economic crisis. In the next section we discuss nature of the impact. 
2.2  Nature of the impact   
The global economic crisis has induced two negative external shocks for African 
countries: 
—  A financial shock, as the availability of credit declined (the credit crunch) and 
the cost of international credit increased (a financial shock); and 
—  A shock to the demand for exports, as most of Africa’s important markets went 
into recession (a trade shock). 
The extent to which African countries are at risk from these two negative impacts 
depends on (i) how vulnerable they are to external trade and financial shocks and   
(ii) how resilient they are in terms of coping with the impact of the crisis. Often the fact 
that African countries have become more resilient in recent years (as witnessed, for 
instance, in the greater prevalence of SF policy environment) is forgotten. Even if a  
country is vulnerable, its resilience will be an important element in crisis coping and 
recovery.  
Vulnerability to trade and financial shocks is determined by Africa’s high dependency 
on exports, undiversified commodity exports, external financial inflows and rapid 
expansion in private sector credit in recent years. As such, the crisis implies that 
revenue from these sources will decline: US$251 billion in export revenue for Africa in 
2009, as estimated by the Committee of African Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors (2009), and according to Naudé (2009b), US$50-60 billion in external 
financial inflows. Let us consider, for instance, each of these in turn. 
Export dependency 
The average export-to-GDP ratio of the African countries is 35 per cent. Around 69 per 
cent of the exports from the continent are destined for advanced economies; about 30 
per cent to the Euro area alone. This suggests that the initial belief of Africa’s growth 
being ‘decoupled’ from that of the US and Europe is unlikely to be borne out. 
                                                 
5  Ireland reduced its aid budget by 10 per cent (€95 million), Italy by 65 per cent and Latvia by 100 per 
cent (see ‘Less and Worse Aid’ at http://www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=3285).  6 
As can be expected, exports from Africa to the US and Europe started to fall as a result 
of the downturn in these economies. Globally, the IMF forecasts a 11 per cent 
contraction in trade and an 8 per cent decline in the share of exports in African GDP. 
Moreover, African exports tend to be concentrated in commodities, with oil, metals and 
minerals and agricultural commodities the most notable. Commodity prices were in a 
boom phase in the pre-crisis period, reaching record levels by June 2008, but dropping 
precipitously since then. Between January 2003 and July 2008, energy, food and metal 
price indices rose, respectively, by 329, 102 and 230 per cent, and then fell by 
respectively 64, 30 and 46 per cent between June 2008 and February 2009 (IMF 2009a). 
Moreover, food prices are still relatively high (more than 40 per cent higher than in 
2003) and will continue to pose in the foreseeable future serious difficulties for 
countries dependent on importing food . 
External financial inflows 
External financial inflows include aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, and 
private portfolio flows. In 2006, aid, FDI and remittances together were equivalent to 
more than 10 per cent of Africa’s GDP. 
By early 2009 there were signs that all these flows had been adversely affected. First, 
private portfolio outflows resulted in declining African stock markets. Between 2007 
and 2008, South Africa’s equity market index fell by 40 per cent, and during the first 
quarter of 2009 the all share index of the Nigerian stock market had fallen a record 37 
per cent. Also, trade finance decreased. The worldwide gap in trade finance had 
expanded from the initial estimate of US$25 billion in November 2008 to US$100 
billion by March 2009 according to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Remittances 
and FDI dropped, and aid was also negatively affected, in part by exchange rate 
changes6 but also by growing expectations that aid budgets would be negatively 
impacted.7  
Growth in credit to the private sector 
Although African countries to date have not had bank failures (as opposed to the 35-odd 
bank collapses in the United States), they are not yet out of danger. As the IMF points 
out, African banks are under considerable financial stress. Their capital bases are at risk 
of being eroded as the crisis continues to weakened African stock markets, stifling 
innovation and leading to less conservative lending practices, resulting in significant 
losses to central banks’ reserve assets, entrenching government ownership in the 
financial sector, and weakening bank balance sheets to the point where bank failure 
could occur (Maimbo 2008). 
Vulnerability of the African countries to a global credit crunch is evidenced by the 
importance and growth of credit to the private sector, the role of foreign banks, and 
growing prominence of the stock markets. Credit to the private sector has been 
                                                 
6   The value of aid from the UK has been reduced by as much as US$41 billion over the next seven 
years due to the shrinking of the UK economy and the depreciation of the pound sterling)  
7   The US President suggested in March that his administration may not achieve its target of doubling 
foreign aid. Other countries such as Ireland, Italy and Latvia have decreased their aid budgets, despite 
commitments made in December 2008 by the advanced countries at Doha. 7 
expanding rapidly in recent years. On average, domestic credit to the private sector in 
Africa now totals more than 70 per cent of GDP. Foreign banks own more than 50 per 
cent of local banking assets in more than half of African countries. In recent years, stock 
markets on the continent have also started to develop rapidly, with stock market 
capitalization by 2007 reaching per cent of GDP, a ratio higher than in any other 
developing or emerging region.  
3 Africa’s  resilience 
The vulnerability of a country should be weighted against its resilience, i.e., its coping 
ability or capacity to recover from shock. Resilience can be nurtured, and depends, inter 
alia, on good economic management and good governance. In this section we briefly 
scrutinize the state of macroeconomic management and governance in Africa during 
crises, noting that a large and growing literature exists on these topics. 
A positive aspect of Africa, even in the current crisis, is the fact that some progress has 
been achieved in recent years in good economic management and governance, although 
much still needs to be done. 
3.1   Macroeconomic management 
Let us consider macroeconomic management first. This is best measured with fiscal and 
current account balances. Figure 1 compares Africa’s position one year prior to the 
current crisis with the corresponding period for previous global recessions (1983 and 
1992). The figure clearly highlights that Africa is in a better position to ward off the 
effects of the current crisis, and as a consequence, IMF is predicting that the impact on 
the continent will not be as severe this time as in previous recessions.  
Figure 1 
Africa’s macroeconomic resilience 
 
Note:   Average subsequent growth for 2007 is the average of IMF’s forecasts for 2009 and 2010 
growth. 
Source of data: IMF (2009a); World Bank (WDI, on line). 8 
As Figure 1 depicts, many African countries have been faced with the ‘twin’ constraint 
of a deficit in both fiscal and current accounts. This meant that during previous 
economic slumps, the countries generally had no leeway to use countercyclical fiscal 
and monetary policy. Indeed, many had to adopt further austerity measures (lower 
spending, higher interest rates). However, as Figure 1 indicates, fiscal balance of the 
countries has improved substantially and Africa’s cover of foreign reserves has 
increased ten-fold over the levels evident during earlier crises. 
3.2  Good governance  
Next, we consider improved governance. Here, the evidence points to a considerable 
improvement in political governance, especially since the 1980s. For example, the 
measure of executive constraint which had deteriorated in the 1970s has improved 
substantially (Figure 2). As Fosu argues (2009a), this measure of governance has a 
powerful positive effect on the prevalence of growth-enhancing policies. 
Figure 2 
Political governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2007 
Source:   Fosu (2009b). 
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Source:   Fosu (2009b). 9 
Similarly, African countries appear to have substantially progressed with the incidence 
of multiparty democracy. The measure of political contestability has risen from an 
average of about 3.0 in the mid-1970s to equal, by 2007, the world’s mean of 6.0 
(Figure 3). This is an important development, as Africa has now surpassed the threshold 
above which further progress with democratization is likely to be growth-generating 
(Fosu 2008).  
Africa’s vulnerability was examined in section 2 and its resilience in this section; the 
potential policy responses are discussed in the following section. 
4  The policy response  
The above analysis shows that while Africa is still highly vulnerable, resilience has 
improved. In addition it needs to be mentioned that the advanced economies’ reaction to 
the crisis has been significant in terms of mobilized funding for getting their economies 
back on a growth path and restoring confidence in their financial sectors. Responses to 
mobilize resources for developing countries have also gathered momentum.8  
Globally coordinated measures, regional responses and country efforts to lift Africa out 
of the crisis will need to focus on (i) mitigation, (ii) coping and (iii) risk reduction 
within the context of each individual country, as circumstances differ in each country. 
Here, we do not have the space to consider the most appropriate responses at individual 
country level and can thus only raise a number of generic actions and considerations.  
Table 1, taken from Naudé (2009c), summarizes the policy responses that could be 
followed. Next, we briefly discuss the proposed policies outlined in Table 1. 
4.1  Mitigation and coping action 
Consistent short-term measures should focus on action aimed at mitigation and actions 
aimed at helping countries to cope.  
Mitigation measures, to be undertaken by both the international community and African 
countries, include:  
—  Monitoring the impact of the crisis in a timely fashion; 
—  Restoring confidence in banks, while continuing to monitor and regulate 
banks; 
—  Expanding trade (also through aid for trade programmes) and avoiding 
creeping protectionism; and  
—  Expanding trade finance.  
                                                 
8   For instance, the G-20 meeting in April 2009 agreed to provide or channel at least US$1.1 trillion 
towards global recovery, of which an additional US$500 billion will go towards trebling the resources 
of the IMF (to the level of US$750 billion). Of this package, US$50 billion has been set aside 
specifically for low-income countries. The G-20 nations also reaffirmed their commitment to ODA 
(Naudé 2009b). 10 
Table 1 
Policy responses to the global economic crisis in Africa  
Objectives Action 
MITIGATION ACTION  
Restore financial confidence  • Monitoring, supervision and regulation of financial institutions 
• Recapitalization of banks where needed 
  
Expand trade  • Avoid protectionism 
• Maintain competitive exchange rate policies 
• Obtain balance-of-payments support 
• Obtain trade finance support  
• Aid for trade 
  
Expand finance   • Increase aid and accelerate aid disbursement 
• Attract FDI 
• Facilitate remittances 
• Stop and return illicit funds/flight capital 
COPING ACTION 
Expand domestic demand  • Undertake public works programmes 
• Prevent unemployment escalating 
• Provide social security, e.g., cash transfers, school feeding 
programmes 
• Consider tax reductions 
  
Absorb financial losses  • Draw down reserves and utilize short-term international 
financial assistance 
  
Expand self-employment  • Relax business regulations 
  
Technical assistance  • Obtain assistance in planning and coordinating responses 
• Ensure the targeting and distribution of assistance 
• Provision of information and monitoring of the impact 
  
Peacekeeping  • Monitor violent conflict 
• Address grievances 
• Contain violence and spillovers 
• Plan for displacements and migrations 
RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES 
Export and production 
diversification  
• Expand south-south trade 
• Promote manufacturing (e.g., through agro-industries) 
• Promote tourism 
• Invest in infrastructure  
  
Banking system strengthen 
and financial deepening 
• Expand access to finance 
• Encourage financial innovation 
• Maintain adequate bank capital requirements 
• Encourage domestic banking expansion 
  
Social cohesion  • End conflicts/promote peace 
• Participatory and inclusive governance 
• Protect minorities 
• Nation-building 
  
Good governance and 
institutional development 
• Build strong and effective government 
• Strengthen basic institutions, i.e., property rights, rule of law, 
contract enforcement, independent judiciary 
  
Reform of international 
financial architecture 
• Give greater voice to SSA 
• Advance the Doha Round, with more development content 
• Reform Bretton Woods 
• More development role for G-20 
• Reform aid architecture: volumes and effectiveness  
• Address global imbalances  
Source: Naudé (2009c) 11 
Of the foregoing measures, the expansion of trade is perhaps the most crucial, as much 
of the adverse shock to Africa and the LDCs is due to the decline in exports. Expanding 
trade is, however, largely dependent on the international community. Here, first of all, 
efforts undertaken to restore growth in the advanced economies are vital. The sooner 
industrialized countries can be turned around, the better the outcome for Africa. 
Moreover, this needs to be done without resorting to protectionism, now identified as 
the hazard to global trade. Efforts to expand trade finance, through the regional 
multilateral finance institutions such as the African Development Bank, for instance, 
could complement the trade-for-aid programmes by the donors and preferential trade 
access for African products. 
The role of African governments in mitigation would be to;  
—  Monitor the impact of the crisis; 
—  Monitor and regulate their own banking systems and check for early signs of 
bank difficulty; 
—  Maintain or promote a positive stance towards trade liberalization and open 
markets; 
—  Lobby for a satisfactory conclusion of a more appropriate, development 
oriented Doha Round; 
—  Work towards improving the supply capacity of African countries, for instance 
through public works programmes targeted to infrastructure and transport 
services; and 
—  Maintain competitive real exchange rates and encourage further regional 
integration and regional trade facilitation measures. 
Coping actions, largely the responsibility of individual countries but supported with 
assistance from donors, would include:  
—  Expanding domestic demand through fiscal and monetary stimulus, where 
possible, in a manner that does not lead to unsustainable debt accumulation; 
—  Absorbing financial losses through foreign reserves in countries that have the 
means and permitting competitive exchange rates to be established; 
—  Targeting the vulnerable through appropriate social safety nets supported by 
aid; 
—  Expanding self-employment, for example, by making the business 
environment easier and through public works programmes; 
—  Utilizing technical assistance in the design and implementation of 
programmes, and  
—  Expanding peacekeeping operations where needed, given the potential for 
escalating conflict in times of economic hardship. 
The international community’s role in mitigation measures is to facilitate the demand 
for Africa’s exports, which is more general and cross-cutting, whereas in measures 
designed to help countries cope with the effect of the crisis, the international community 
needs to be more alert to country-level differences. This is where it is important to be 
able to identify countries most at risk, and to ensure that assistance is tailor-made to 12 
specific circumstances. Such assistance would be twofold: assisting African 
governments with financial resources so as to alleviate poverty and to maximize the 
level of such aid’s effectiveness (ascertaining that aid is appropriately utilized and that it 
does not divert local production), and to provide technical assistance or even 
peacekeeping operations, if necessary. African governments, in turn, should take care 
that expansionary policies do not lead to unsustainable budget deficits or debt burdens, 
and that the appeal of private sector activity is improved.  
4.2  Risk reduction through improved governance 
African countries need to reduce risk; it is not enough to merely mitigate risk or to cope 
with risk. Given the nature of the crisis, this implies that what is required is 
diversification of the economies, improvement of the environment for doing business, 
and reform of the global financial and aid architecture. In all of these, the strengthening 
of governance is a prerequisite. As Fosu (2009b; 2009c) indicates, improvement in 
governance has gone hand in hand with the establishment of SF policy environment in 
Africa.  
As the evidence in section 2 suggests, many countries in Africa have, on average, 
improved governance through institutional reform, but it is also true that many others 
are still lagging behind. An important concern for a number of these countries is that 
such reform can be fraught with potential political disorder, requiring appropriate 
support to these countries in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict (Fosu 2008). 
Conversely, we must also be cognizant of the need to preserve the achievements of the 
countries that have succeeded with reforms. This would require appropriate support to 
reduce the potential for political opportunism during crises, which could reverse the 
success achieved to date. Some of Africa’s high-risk countries fall in this category. 
Finally, stronger domestic governance in Africa will go a long way towards supporting 
improved international governance of the global economic and financial systems. This, 
in turn, will contribute to longer-term economic development. 
5  Risks to Africa’s development 
Given the vulnerability of Africa (section 2), and our argument that the continent’s 
resilience has improved (section 3) as a result of better economic management and 
governance, we can examine the risks posed by the global economic crisis, particularly 
in terms of the nature of the shocks (section 2.2). 
5.1  Consequences of the crisis for growth and development 
First, given the impact and nature of the crisis, we have to recognize that the global 
economic crisis does pose a huge, but not insurmountable, risk to the growth and 
development of Africa. Frustratingly, the adverse impact came at a time when Africa 
was growing strongly, with an overall per capita growth rate exceeding that of the world 
each year for the last several years. The shocks will substantially reduce African 
economic momentum. 13 
Economic growth may not be the perfect indicator of progress, but the consensus is that 
economic growth is necessary for development. In the case of Africa, it has been 
estimated that an annual average growth rate of 7 per cent needs to be maintained if the 
continent is to achieve at least the first of the Millennium Development Goals, i.e., to 
halve the number of people living on less than one dollar a day. Africa’s growth 
projections for 2009 and 2010 have been reduced substantially by international financial 
institutions to reflect the effects of the financial and economic crisis. For instance, the 
IMF has revised Africa’s economic forecasts for 2009 downwards from 5 per cent in 
October 2008, to 3.5 per cent in January 2009 to 1.7 per cent in April 2009. The World 
Bank also modified its growth prospects for the continent to 2.4 per cent for 2009. Note, 
however, that contrary to previous global recessions, African GDP will not contract this 
time. 
The consequences of a reduction in growth, even if African economies can avoid 
shrinking, are likely to be higher unemployment and poverty, increases in infant 
mortality, and adverse coping with long-lasting impacts such as higher school dropout 
rates, reductions in healthcare, and environmental degradation, inter alia. 
To assess the risk to Africa’s development in context, it is necessary to briefly review 
the continent’s growth performance and relate this to the policy-syndromes defined in 
the introduction. 
Figure 4, depicting GDP per capita growth in Africa and the world economy between 
1961 and 2007, highlights SSA’s good recent growth record. 
Figure 4 
GDP per capita growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the world, 1961-2007 
 
Source:   Fosu (2009b). 
The figure also shows that African growth has been very volatile. Indeed, according to 
Fosu (2007: 2), the standard deviation of African GDP growth over the period 1961-
2001 has been the highest among all regions. This reflects the fact that SSA growth has 
been characterized by ‘boom-and-bust’ episodes and exposure to shocks, many of which 











































































were external, like the current crisis. Often, these adverse circumstances led countries to 
adopt anti-growth policy syndromes, stifling in the process long-term growth and 
development. 
As Fosu documents (2009c: 20-1), negative as well as positive external shocks often 
resulted in poor policy responses. Consider, for instance, negative shocks. As net 
importers of oil, most African countries experienced the negative petroleum supply 
shocks of the 1970s as they did again in 2008. Others were also afflicted by drought in 
the 1970s which led to diminished food supplies, as were many countries hit by the 
2008 food price crisis. In the 1970s, however, the response was sub-optimal: 
governments fixed prices in the face of these shocks in order to keep goods and services 
affordable to the citizenry at large, particularly to the urban elites who seemed to form 
the political support base for these governments (Bates 1981). But such a policy led to 
more and/or stricter state controls, which repressed longer-term recover.  
Furthermore, governments did not fare very well either in the face of positive external 
shocks. For instance, the 1970s (similarly to more recent times) were characterized by 
commodity booms, which, as Fosu (2009c) documents, gave rise to the suboptimal 
inter-temporal resource allocation syndrome. This involved exuberant spending during 
booms and subsequent underspending during the fiscal difficulties, as exemplified by 
phosphate in Togo, 1974-89 (Gouge and Evlo 2004); oil in Cameroon, 1982-93 (Kobou 
and Njinkeu 2004); phosphates and groundnuts in Senegal, 1974-79 (Ndiaye 2004); 
bauxite in Guinea, 1973-84 (Doumbouya and Camara 2003); coffee in Burundi, 
1975-85 (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2003); uranium in Niger, 1974-85 (Mamadou and 
Yakoubou 2006); and oil in Nigeria, 1974-86 (Iyoha and Oriakhi 2004). Moreover, 
many governments in the past used boom-time revenues to reward their cronies and 
ethnic constituencies, and during bust periods tended to maintain such a redistribution at 
the expense of the rest of the population, a phenomenon termed as the adverse 
redistribution policy syndrome. In some cases, adverse redistribution obstructed long-
term development through increased polarization, and eventually state failure as in 
Angola (1973-2002), Burundi (1988-2000), Chad (1979-84), DRC (1996-2005), Sierra 
Leone (1991-2000), Togo (1991-93), and Uganda (1979-86), for instance. 
5.2  Pitfalls in policy responses 
From the brief description of Africa’s past experiences given in the previous subsection, 
it is clear that external shocks can jeopardize long-term growth and development if the 
government makes wrong policy choices and ends up promoting anti-growth policy 
syndromes. In particular, the following situations need to be avoided: 
Boom-and-bust cycles 
Another boom-bust cycle and enflaming the historically high volatility of African 
growth should be avoided. Boom-and-bust cycles, a feature of Africa’s growth 
experience since 1961 (Figure 1), have a very negative impact on investment and 
productivity growth over the long term. The effects on poverty and other development 
indicators are also asymmetric between boom and bust episodes. Thus, while efforts 
should focus on the prevention of a downturn as much as possible, care should be taken 
so as not to generate boom-bust cycle. According to Arbache and Page (2008: 9): 15 
While growth accelerations result in relatively small improvements in human 
development, decelerations have important negative impacts on education and 
health outcomes. Under 5 mortality and infant mortality, for example, are 
substantially higher during growth decelerations than in normal times, but they 
do not improve during growth accelerations.  
As Sachs (2009) recently pointed out;  
We should stop panicking ... Panics end badly, even panics of policy; more 
moderate policies will be safer in the medium term ... there is little reason to 
fear a decade of stagflation, much less a depression.  
As shown above, Africa, despite the downturn, will not be in recession, and may have 
increased resilience for recovery without inducing an unsustainable boom. 
Unsustainable debt 
Generating another debt crisis can be a grave danger. The continent’s boom-and-bust 
cycles of the past have often been accompanied by episodes of sovereign indebtedness, 
snaring many African and LDCs in a debt trap in the 1990s. While many of these 
nations have benefitted9 from the highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative and 
the multilateral debt relief initiative (MDRI), the current crisis is likely to put pressure 
on both developing-country expenditures (given the global calls for fiscal expansion) 
and revenue (as tax income declines due to a reduction in trade and economic activity), 
with the likelihood of increased debts. As sovereign bond issues become more difficult 
and expensive in light of the global credit crunch, many countries may be tempted to 
increase lending from regional banks and the Bretton Woods institutions (Ladd 2009). 
Unsustainable debts and irresponsible lending are hazards to be avoided (Jubilee Debt 
Campaign 2009). Preventing another debt crisis may require deeper debt cancellation, 
greater efforts to improve domestic resource mobilization in African countries 
(Aryeetey 2009) and implementation of a more appropriate ‘international mechanism 
for sovereign debt restructuring, which includes provisions for temporary moratoria on 
debt servicing’ (Ladd 2009: 1). 
Adverse coping 
A considerable challenge in the face of this crisis is preventing households from 
engaging in adverse coping strategies that have lasting impact. There is risk that the 
most vulnerable will be left to fend for themselves, and that inequality and polarization 
will increase, threatening stability. Therefore, what is required for the countries of 
Africa is not fiscal stimulus as such, but government expenditures that are of the right 
type and specifically targeted. Indeed, it may be argued that now is the opportunity for 
many countries to implement and/or strengthen their social safety  nets. Safety  net 
programmes should include unconditional as well as conditional cash transfers to poor 
households, and public works programmes (see Ravallion 2008). 
                                                 
9   Total indebtedness of African countries, and of the developing countries in general, remains high. As 
pointed out by the Jubilee Debt Campaign (2009), developing-country debt stocks total US$2.9 
trillion and daily debt repayments from developing to advanced countries amount to almost US$100 
million. 16 
In addition, where resources permit, expenditures related to public works such as trade 
and transport infrastructure may be important. It will not only offer relief by creating 
short-term jobs, but also contribute to improving productive capacity in the economy by 
strengthening needed infrastructure. In the past, investment expenditures were often 
substantially reduced during crises, delaying recovery and depressing longer-term 
growth. 
Reversing liberalization 
A third hazard that needs to be avoided by African countries in responding to the crisis 
is reversal of the gains made in recent years by opening up the economies. Many 
countries may contemplate re-introduction of crippling state controls such as higher 
tariffs, price controls, and sectoral subsidies.  
We are not cautioning against this in order to limit the policy space of countries to 
confront the crisis, but rather to stress the fact that although these measures may seem to 
bring short-term advantages, such as rising government revenue through increased 
tariffs perhaps or limiting state expenditure through price controls, these will have to be 
seen against long-term impacts which may, as it has often happened in the past, damage 
the ability and competitiveness of the private sector to react and adjust, and can thus 
lead to retaliatory actions. SSA countries, however, do have scope within the WTO to 
apply safeguard mechanisms to provide, amongst others, credit to domestic firms and to 
engage in government procurement programmes to stimulate the domestic economy. 
But we also recognize that the WTO itself needs reform (see also Gallagher and Wise 
2009), and that this change should be an important aspect of the longer-term responses 
to reduce the risks of Africa’s nations. 
5.3  Entrenching global inequities 
It is not only up to the African countries themselves to avoid pitfalls in policy responses 
to the crisis. In particular, there is a responsibility on advanced countries not to entrench 
inequities and inefficiencies in the global financial and aid architecture. The latter 
constitutes a risk inherent in the reaction to the crisis by the G-20 nations and requires a 
more inclusive response on the part of the UN. As Naudé (2009c) recently points out: 
the G-20 largely ignored any substantial agreements on long-term changes to 
the global financial system. Their recognition of the need to reform the IMF 
and World Bank has been noted, and in this regard perhaps the most significant 
gesture has been the added US$500 billion earmarked for the IMF. But herein 
may lie a problem, in that the short-term desire to get funding to developing 
countries as quickly as possible may perpetuate the very financial system 
developing countries have been objecting to. Indeed, one of the other ‘winners’ 
of the current financial crisis has been the IMF, which will see its resources 
trebled and its influence over developing and other countries potentially 
expand.  
Will African governments and the international community be able to sidestep these 
pitfalls? We are optimistic, based on the fact that governance and political 
contestability, unlike in the 1970s, have improved significantly across the continent. 
Also, there is an urgency in the world economy—perhaps unlike any in the past—for 17 
reforming global institutions. Therefore, in our view, there is opportunity to align 
Africa’s development needs even closer with those of the global economy.  
6 Concluding  remarks   
Africa is the developing region most at risk from the global economic crisis. Its growth 
forecast for 2009 has been slashed from 5 to 1.7 per cent. Its exports, as a percentage of 
GDP, are expected to shrink by 8 per cent. Revenues, totalling as much as US$100 
billion, could be lost in 2009 alone. The consequences can be dire: three million more 
unemployed and up to 36 million more thrown into ‘working poverty’, with numerous 
consequences likely to leave permanent scars: higher infant mortality, greater school 
dropout rates, more widespread malnutrition, rising crime and conflict, and accelerated 
emigration, to name but a few.  
These impacts come on the heels of the food and fuel price shocks of 2007/08. This may 
put development on the poorest continent of the world back by years. In the past, 
declining incomes have been associated with the outbreak of conflict, and the present 
crisis may well trigger an escalation of tension across the continent. In fact, since the 
crisis erupted in October 2008, there have been a number of new disturbances. 
We believe that Africa can—and will—recover. In this paper we have called for a 
‘syndrome-free’ (SF) recovery, which is improvement that does not contain seeds of its 
own destruction. We are optimistic that Africa will heed the lessons of the past, and will 
be able to steer clear of the pitfalls through improved governance.  
However, it is not only the pitfalls of its own making that African governments should 
attempt to sidestep, but also inadvertent consequences of the way in which the advanced 
economies of the world choose to address their own recession. Here, there are three 
requirements. First is their role in ensuring that trade channels to Africa are kept open, 
that promised aid is distributed, and at accelerated pace; and that irresponsible lending 
which could lead to a debt crisis in a few years is avoided. Second, advanced countries 
should ensure that fiscal stimuli and bank bailouts in the west should not entrench the 
status quo of the global financial architecture by providing ‘financial protectionism’ to 
banks in advanced countries, supporting the US dollar, and re-energizing the Bretton 
Woods institutions. And finally, work has to undertaken to reform the global financial 
architecture. In this respect, the United Nations (UN) Conference on the World 
Financial and Economic Crisis and its impact on Development taking place in New 
York on 24 to 26 June 2009 may be of historical importance. It offers a unique 
opportunity for African countries to put their case forward and to push for appropriate 
short-term assistance and the coordination of recovery plans—not least to limit the 
potential negative consequences as the advanced economies strive to get back on their 
feet. It also offers an opportunity to work for better global financial and economic 
governance and for mechanisms to coordinate responses for resolving the growing 
number of global challenges Africa is increasingly exposed to, not the least of which are 
the food and energy crises. Finally, if the conference succeeds in putting Africa’s 
plight—as the poorest and most-at risk-region—on centre stage in the response to the 
crisis, it may facilitate an encompassing approach to deal with Africa’s challenges in a 
much more collective fashion than has been the case. 18 
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